
The rise of ESG rating agencies and management of corporate ESG violations
A recent study published in the Journal of Banking and Finance by Prof. Yi XIANG, from the School of Accounting and Finance (AF) at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU), titled "The Rise of ESG Rating Agencies and Management of Corporate ESG Violatios", provides a clear answer.
This study explores whether ESG rating agencies affect managers’ incentives to reduce corporate misconduct, using the likelihood and frequency of ESG violations as metrics. By analyzing data from four major ESG rating agencies (ASSET4, KLD, IVA, and Sustainalytics) on U.S. firms between 2000 and 2018, the study observes a significant negative correlation between the initiation and intensity of ESG rating agency coverage and the incidence and number of ESG violations. This result confirms that ESG rating agencies can effectively act as external monitors to reduce corporate ESG violations.
The study finds that ESG rating coverage is associated with fewer violations: compared to firms without rating coverage, firms covered by ESG rating agencies experience an 8.77% decrease in the incidence of ESG violations and an 11.23% reduction in the frequency of such violations. Moreover, as firms are covered by more ESG rating agencies, the severity of their ESG violations (proxied by penalty amounts) may also decrease. Through dynamic tests, the study further confirms that firms’ violations only decrease significantly after the initiation of rating coverage (not before), ruling out the interference of "firms avoiding violations in advance."
Notably, the supervisory effect of ESG ratings is more pronounced for firms with "lower levels of corporate monitoring" (whether through internal or external mechanisms). Firms with less analyst coverage, limited media attention, and poor ESG disclosure quality show a greater reduction in violations after being covered by ratings. This indicates that ESG rating agencies fill the governance gap for such firms—i.e., firms with lower prior monitoring levels are more likely to change their ESG-related behaviors after gaining coverage from ESG rating agencies.
In addition, the study finds that rated firms tend to have a stronger incentive to prioritize addressing "common and high-frequency violations." Firms focus on resolving high-frequency violations that are easily noticed by rating agencies, such as those related to safety, the environment, employee rights, and consumer protection; in contrast, the impact of rating coverage on low-frequency violations (e.g., those related to government regulation or healthcare) is weaker. This reflects firms’ response logic to the key areas of focus of rating agencies.
Compared to the disclosure of positive information, the public disclosure of firms’ negative information is more likely to strengthen public scrutiny and motivate firms to avoid the detection of irresponsible behaviors. Furthermore, firms with lower initial ESG ratings are also more likely to attract the attention of the public and regulators, increasing the probability that their violations are detected. Compared to firms with strong ESG performance, firms with poor ESG performance may face greater external pressure once their ESG scores are published by ESG rating agencies; this enhanced scrutiny, in turn, incentivizes underperforming firms to avoid corporate misconduct. Meanwhile, firms with less divergent ESG ratings have a stronger incentive to reduce violations after being covered by ESG rating agencies.
The study’s findings offer several specific implications for firms, policymakers, and the corporate governance role of ESG rating agencies:
For firms: ESG rating agencies act as governance tools and help mitigate ESG risks. Firms should leverage such insights to strengthen internal controls and governance, managing ESG risks effectively and meeting stakeholder expectations.
For policymakers: The findings underscore the need for a regulatory framework for ESG rating agencies. As ESG ratings’ influence on corporates grows, regulators should ensure transparent and consistent methodologies. Clearer standards and disclosure of rating criteria/weightings will boost ESG ratings’ credibility and supervisory role, making them reliable tools for corporate change.
From a corporate governance view, ESG rating agencies are key participants, complementing traditional mechanisms (e.g., board oversight). They act as external monitors to push firms toward ethical and sustainable practices. Rating agencies must prioritize objective, accurate assessments, optimize methodologies to comprehensively capture corporate ESG performance, and avoid rating divergence. Consistent, accurate ratings will solidify their role as trusted capital market intermediaries, supporting firms’ long-term sustainable and ethical governance.
Keywords: Rating Agencies, Misconduct, Violation, Scrutiny
Research Paper: Tsang, A., Wang, Y., Xiang, Y., & Yu, L. (2024). The rise of ESG rating agencies and management of corporate ESG violations. Journal of Banking and Finance.
👉 Read the full article here: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426624002267

ESG評級機構的興起及企業ESG違規行為的管理
在當下,企業 ESG(環境、社會、治理)表現對巨額投資決策有關鍵影響。可 ESG 評級機構 —— 評估企業 ESG 實踐的第三方機構,真的能促使企業更負責任地運作嗎?近期,發表於Journal of Banking and Finance,由香港理工大學(PolyU)會計與金融學院(AF)的向易教授題為《The rise of ESG rating agencies and management of corporate ESG violations》的研究給了明確答案。
在本研究中,文章探討 ESG 評級機構是否會影響管理者減少公司不當行為的動機,以 ESG 違規行為的可能性和頻率來衡量。透過分析四大 ESG 評級機構(ASSET4、KLD、IVA 和 Sustainalytics)2000 年至 2018 年期間對美國公司的數據,我們觀察到 ESG 評級機構的評級起始和強度與 ESG 違規行為的發生率和數量之間存在顯著的負相關關係。這一結果證實了ESG評級機構可以有效地充當外部監督者,以減少企業ESG違規行為。
研究發現,ESG 評級意味著更少違規,與未被評級覆蓋的企業相比,被 ESG 評級機構覆蓋的企業,ESG 違規發生率下降 8.77%,違規頻率降低 11.23%。在企業被更多 ESG 評級機構覆蓋後,其 ESG 違規行為的嚴重程度也可能會降低。研究通過動態檢驗進一步證實,僅在評級覆蓋啟動後(而非覆蓋前),企業違規才明顯減少,排除了 “企業提前規避違規” 的干擾。
值得注意的是, ESG 評級的監督效果,對於企業監控程度較低的公司(無論是透過內部或外部機制)來說,影響更為顯著。分析師涵蓋少、媒體關注度低、ESG披露质量不佳的企業,被評等覆蓋後違規降幅更大。這表明,ESG 評級機構填補了這類企業的治理缺口。即先前監管水平較低的公司在獲得 ESG 評級機構報告後,更有可能改變其行為。
除此之外,研究發現受評公司往往更有動力優先處理常見且頻繁的違規行為。企業會優先解決安全、環境、員工、消費者保護等 「易被評級機構關注的高頻違規」;而對 「政府監管、醫療」 等低頻違規,評級覆蓋的影響較弱,體現出企業對評級機構關注重點的響應邏輯。
與揭露正面資訊相比,公開揭露公司負面資訊更有可能加強公眾監督,促使公司避免不負責任的行為被發現。此外,初始 ESG 評級較低的公司也更有可能引起公眾和監管機構的關注,並使其違規行為被發現。與 ESG 表現強勁的公司相比,ESG 表現較差的公司一旦其 ESG 評分被 ESG 評級機構公佈,可能會面臨更大的外部壓力。這種加強的審查反過來可能會激勵表現不佳的公司避免企業不當行為。而ESG 評級分歧較小的公司在獲得 ESG 評級機構的覆蓋後,有更強的動機減少違規行為。
該研究結果對企業、政策制定者以及 ESG 評級機構的公司治理角色具有若干具體的啟示:
對企業而言:ESG評級機構是治理工具,有助於降低ESG風險。企業應利用這些洞察來加強內部控制和治理,有效管理ESG風險並滿足利害關係人的期望。
對於政策制定者:研究結果強調了ESG評級機構監管框架的必要性。隨著ESG評級對企業的影響力日益增強,監管機構應確保評級方法的透明度和一致性。更清晰的標準和評級標準/權重的揭露將提升ESG評級的可信度和監管作用,使其成為企業變革的可靠工具。
從公司治理的角度來看,ESG評級機構是關鍵參與者,是傳統機制(例如董事會監督)的補充。它們充當外部監督者,推動企業邁向道德和永續的實踐。評級機構必須優先考慮客觀、準確的評估,優化方法以全面捕捉企業ESG績效,並避免評級分歧。一致、準確的評級將鞏固其作為值得信賴的資本市場中介機構的地位,支持企業長期可持續的合乎道德的治理。
關鍵詞:評級機構、不當行為 違規行為 審查
研究論文(只限英文版):Tsang, A., Wang, Y., Xiang, Y., & Yu, L. (2024). The rise of ESG rating agencies and management of corporate ESG violations. Journal of Banking and Finance.
👉 閱讀完整文章:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426624002267

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