Selected Publications

 

l   _..Do Prime Brokers Matter in the Search for Informed Hedge Fund Managers? (with George O. Aragon and Ji-Woong Chung), 2023, Management Science 69, 4932-4952.

 

o    Using the setting of funds of hedge funds (FoFs), we show that prime brokers (PBs) facilitate investors' search for informed hedge fund managers. We find that FoFs exhibit PB bias, a disproportionate preference for hedge funds serviced by their connected PBs. This PB bias is stronger when the cost of hedge fund due diligence is higher relative to capital and when the FoF's management firm generates higher prime brokerage fees. PB bias also predicts FoF performance: the highest PB-bias quartile outperforms the rest by 2.08%–2.45% per annum, after adjusting for differences in their risks.

 

 

l   _..Timescale Betas and the Cross Section of Equity Returns: Framework, Application, and Implications for Interpreting the Fama-French Factors (with Francis In and Tong Suk Kim), 2017, Journal of Empirical Finance 42, 15-39.

 

o    We show that standard beta pricing models quantify an asset's systematic risk as a weighted combination of a number of different timescale betas. Given this, we develop a wavelet-based framework that examines the cross-sectional pricing implications of isolating these timescale betas. An empirical application to the Fama-French model reveals that the model's well-known empirical success is largely due to the beta components associated with a timescale just short of a business cycle (i.e., wavelet scale 3). This implies that any viable explanation for the success of the Fama-French model that has been applied to the Fama-French factors should apply particularly to the scale 3 components of the factors. We find that a risk-based explanation conforms closely to this implication.

 

o   _Online Appendix

 

 

l      Prime Broker-Level Comovement in Hedge Fund Returns: Information or Contagion? (with Ji-Woong Chung), 2016, Review of Financial Studies 29, 3321-3353.

 

o   .We document strong comovement in the returns of hedge funds sharing the same prime broker. This comovement is driven neither by funds in the same family nor in the same style, and it is distinct from market-wide and local comovement. The common information hypothesis attributes this phenomenon to the prime broker providing valuable information to its hedge fund clients. The prime broker-level contagion hypothesis attributes the comovement to the prime broker spreading funding liquidity shocks across its hedge fund clients. We find strong evidence supporting the common information hypothesis, but limited evidence in favor of the prime broker-level contagion hypothesis.

 

o   Online Appendix

 

 

l   _..A Longer Look at the Asymmetric Dependence between Hedge Funds and the Equity Markets (with Francis In, Gunky Kim, and Tong Suk Kim), 2010, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45, 763-789.

 

o   .This paper reexamines, at a range of investment horizons, the asymmetric dependence between hedge fund returns and market returns. Given the current availability of hedge fund data, the joint distribution of longer-horizon returns is extracted from the dynamics of monthly returns using the filtered historical simulation; we then apply the method based on copula theory to uncover the dependence structure therein. While the direction of asymmetry remains unchanged, the magnitude of asymmetry is attenuated considerably as the investment horizon increases. Similar horizon effects also occur on the tail dependence. Our findings suggest that nonlinearity in hedge fund exposure to market risk is more short term in nature, and that hedge funds provide higher benefits of diversification, the longer the horizon.

 


 

Selected Working Papers

 

l   _..Does Portfolio Disclosure Make Money Smarter? (with Andrew J. Sinclair and Stig J. Xeno), 2021

 

o   .We provide causal evidence that mandatory portfolio disclosure helps investors evaluate and select hedge fund managers. Using a staggered difference-in-differences analysis, we demonstrate that investor capital flows better predict fund performance among funds that publicly disclose their portfolio holdings. Additional cross-sectional analyses suggest that this gain in selection ability varies with the informational value of disclosure. Furthermore, examining investor-level allocations, we find that institutional investors earn higher returns on their allocations to disclosing funds. Overall, these results help contribute to the cost-benefit analysis of mandatory portfolio disclosure.

 

 

Click here for papers on SSRN

 


 

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