In a rallying speech that launched the New Life Movement, Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed that the Chinese nation’s rejuvenated modern life could be boiled down simply to three things—rites, music (liyue), and time. The edifying effects of rite and music combined with the enhanced productivity and efficiency of punctuality, Chiang explained, would raise the “moral quality and intellect” of the people and thwart foreign invaders who were taking advantage of China’s degeneracy and encroaching upon its national space.¹

For an ambitious state program that his US-educated wife once compared to fascism in Italy, five-year plans in the Soviet Union, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, one might be tempted to dismiss its emphasis on getting citizens to sing in tune and attend meetings on time as helplessly ludicrous.² Yet, Chiang’s juxtaposition of rite and music, aesthetic categories infused with the Confucian ideal of social and moral order embodied by the
Western Zhou (circa 1066—771 BCE) imperial court, and mechanical clock discipline was more than coincidental. Indeed, for a regime that explicitly rejected undertaking radical changes in social relations, and for which fighting against imperialist economic and political interests did not always constitute a national priority, the Guomindang (GMD) state’s ideal of an independent modern nation-state was a contradiction-ridden affair. Chiang’s GMD revolution entailed the construction of a national space that, while tied to the imperative of capitalist production and exchange dictated by the very colonial powers from which China was to be freed, was to distinguish itself as an organic community of disciplined masses bound together by the common desire for moral rectitude, voluntarism, and pristine order. In this sense, the New Life Movement was nothing less than an intensified expression of the GMD’s anti-imperialist nation-building project.

The GMD vision for China was a failed one. Full-scale conflict with Japan and the ensuing military showdown with the communists weakened at the core whatever program, including the New Life Movement itself, the party-state instituted to materialize what it saw as the ultimate goal of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist revolution. Yet, the full implications of the GMD revolutionary project can still be glimpsed in instances of Nationalist social life, such as that of school campuses, where the party-state enacted an allusion to China’s new life by mobilizing modern technologies such as the mechanical clock to project a community of cooperation, discipline, and salubrious harmony abstracted from the chaos, fissures, and compromised sovereignty that so defined the GMD polity.

In this article, I address the problematic of time and space in a semicolonial location presided loosely by a regime that committed itself to being a part of global capitalism but wanted to avoid its deleterious effects. I examine how spatial planning and the inscription of time discipline came firmly under the purview of a modernizing state as the accumulation of capital became a great priority. I am interested in not only spatial and temporal configurations of everyday life but also the inseparable issue of what Henri Lefebvre calls space as the “medium” of social practices that bind political power relations together with the economic. In China, conscious use of urban-planning practices, along with institutions such as merchant associations and trade unions, to enhance productivity and create a cohesive society
preoccupied Sun Yat-sen’s GMD since the late 1910s, when the party occupied nothing more than a province of the country.4 These processes accelerated under a radicalized GMD through the 1920s, when the party formed an alliance with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and adopted mobilization techniques from the Soviet Union. Interpellation of a new society and a fledging industrial economy thus underpinned the spatial arrangements of the emerging nation-state. With the advent of a modern mass society in China, possessing the technologies to reshape seemingly “neutral” spaces was to wield the power to redefine social relations that were inextricably tied to global processes under the capitalist world market.5 Since the mid-nineteenth century, this world market manifested itself in China institutionally in the form of imperialist intrusion, against which the new nation-state was constructed. In this sense, the GMD’s dramatic conservative turn under Chiang Kai-shek signified a shift in not only spatial and temporal politics but also the regime’s approach to coping with global capitalism and fighting imperialism. Indeed, I argue that an adequate critique of the GMD’s earnest manipulation of space and time cannot begin without taking into account the reactionary strategies the party-state had adopted on nation- and society-building since 1927.

One primary goal of this article is thus to delineate the peculiarities of the GMD approach to nation-building. As such, I take issue with recent scholarship that sees the two major competing revolutionary movements in modern China—the GMD and the CCP—as being fundamentally the same. Many scholars, often drawing from poststructuralist critiques of Enlightenment rationality and postcolonialist critiques of national liberation movements, sees China’s twentieth-century nation-building project as one continuous enterprise that saw the increasingly obliteration of diversities by nationalism, developmentalism, and state socialism. Against this oppressive modern rationality, these critics celebrate the proliferation of particularistic spaces inflected by ethnic and gender identities and emotional efflorescence. Spatial differences are endowed with a subversive potential vis-à-vis the homogenized space and time presided by a nation-state. This article argues, through a critique of GMD’s spatial politics, that projecting spaces of difference and genuine sentiments is no guarantor of emancipatory politics. I also interrogate the view that reduces the history of revolutionary movements to
a unilinear process of oppressive homogenization and conclude that without challenging the entirety of social relations, pluralistic élan dovetails comfortably with capitalist domination and attendant oppressive technologies. As far as the GMD is concerned, the privileging of a uniform aestheticized everyday experience, coupled with an inability to bring an end to the fragmentation of China’s political and economic sovereignty, determined the regime’s politics of space and set it apart from that under either the GMD-CCP alliance before 1927 or the communist regime after 1949.

1. Spaces in Capitalist Modernity

Many critics, however, are happy to overlook such an important shift in a state’s stance on socioeconomic arrangements and national independence as in 1920s China. Modern societies stood in the interstices in which the rationalization of space converged with commodification of labor time. The increasing prevalence of industrial production combined with the post-Enlightenment cult of progress resulted in nation-states that apparently could only have behaved as mediators of the ever more potent Foucauldian disciplinary power. The state’s role in rationalizing temporal experiences seems to be particularly strong in late-industrializing societies, in which the imposition of such time-reckoning tools as the Gregorian calendar, national time zones, and clock time since the second half of the nineteenth century accompanied its central role in the spread of modern transport and communication networks. In colonial Bengal, where industrial development was minimal under British rule, the main propagators of clock-time discipline among middle-class urbanites were not factories but such space-transforming state projects as railways and telegraph lines, the colonial bureaucracy, and the public education system. Yet, it is often postcolonial states, many of them products of nationalist and communist movements, that share the largest blame for furthering the homogenization of space and quantification of time that characterize Enlightenment instrumental reason in poststructuralist critiques of modernity. Partha Chatterjee, for a prominent example, faulted the postcolonial Indian state for homogenizing the multitude of communities, narratives, and interests for the sake of development. Insofar as upholding the doctrine of teleological progress is
concerned, Chatterjee sees no differences between the left and the right. Similarly, architectural historian Anthony Vidler sees a host of ideologically antagonistic twentieth-century regimes, including liberal capitalist United States and state socialist Russia, wielding the technologies of architectural modernism to submit a depoliticized labor force under the constricting rhythm of the nation-state’s production spaces. As a product of Enlightenment modernity, the nation-state, regardless of its specific social agendas, only worked to tighten the disciplinary effect of homogenization.

Such poststructuralist critique of the modern nation-state is well represented among the more theoretically inclined of scholars interested in modern China. The best of these scholars combine receptiveness to theoretical innovations on modernity and its implications for postcolonial societies with careful empirical research. By examining specific aspects of social life, they show that Chinese reformers and revolutionaries through the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries were enthusiastic mediators and executors of cutting-edge technologies introduced to the country by imperialism. Surveying a wide range of modern spaces, including law courts, factories, and schools, sociologist Hwang Jinlin presents a narrative of increasing subsumption of individual bodies under the confines of state sovereignty that begins from the earliest industrialization program carried out by the Qing in the late nineteenth century and continues to this very day with the developmentalism espoused by the modernizing states on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and indeed any other state around the globe. The strive to survive in the capitalist nation-state system was so relentless that even the Chinese communist movement at its revolutionary phrase could not afford not to impose a stringent time discipline to extract the maximum amount of surplus value from laboring bodies. Ruth Rogaski’s study on the rise of modern health practices in Tianjin traces an uncanny pattern of “indigenous elites,” from the struggling Qing government in the 1900s to the victorious Maoist regime at mid-century, actively embracing and shaping discourses on hygiene and medicine first brought about by imperialist violence. Works such as Hwang’s and Rogaski’s convincingly suggest that it is no longer possible to understand China's experience of modernity as being tainted by its tradition, Confucian or otherwise, any more than Euroamerica or Japan were informed by theirs.
Curiously, a sense of Chinese exceptionalism still lurks behind such indictment of homogenizing tendencies under the global nation-state form. The poststructuralist view that communist or national liberation movements ultimately inherited and reinforced the strictures of bourgeois modernity dovetails with a procedure much more established in Cold War sinology: explaining modern China’s failure to embrace Western-style liberal democracy. In Rogaski’s study, for instance, a Foucault-inflected genealogy of the hygienic regime perfected by the People’s Republic that began with the globally circulating processes of urban spatial remapping and body disciplining, first experimented with during the Republican period, overlaps with the rather commonplace liberal complaint of communist indoctrination in matters of citizens’ personal well-being. Likewise, for Wen-hsin Yeh, the clock-time discipline of the Bank of China, spatialized in the form of staff dormitories during the 1930s, anticipated the even more stringent discipline of work units (danwei) prevalent in urban China under communism. The critique of governmentality sits comfortably with the typical sinological obsession with pointing out how, regardless of ideological differences, Chinese states are predisposed to behave in a similarly despotic manner distinct from Western humanist ideals. Substituting for a narrative of China’s failure to discard its moribund traditions is one of the country’s exceptionally uncritical embraces of modern excesses.

This approach to modernity has major limitations. Critiques of instrumental reason often operate through binary oppositions between state and society or elites and subalterns. Chatterjee complicates these dualisms somewhat by proposing the opposition between capital and community, with the progressive, rational, and universal capital rendering the latter into its backward “other.” Yet all these dualisms, combined with the persisting tendency in area studies to treat nation-states as discrete if no longer disconnected units, still result in the reduction of social processes to something akin to the Hegelian metaphor of master-slave relation—an idealized dynamic between stronger groupings’ quest for hegemony and the underdogs’ resistance against it. The results of such dualist typology is to extract national spaces, along with the social processes that take place in them, from the global operation of the capitalist mode of production. Having dehistori-
cized the category of nation vis-à-vis global capitalism, one can then dismiss the differences between nation-states that perpetuate the capitalist and colonial order and those that sought to transform social relations and reinvent an alternative politics of space as superficial. How else are we to understand Rogaski’s lumping together of foreign concessions and the GMD, which thrived on political and economic fragmentation of China, and the communists, who sought to bring about a unified nation and society, as representing the same sort of regimes because they were all committed to crafting modern hygienic spaces? It is as though the only story worth telling about China’s semicolonial condition is how the Chinese states succumbed one after another to the curse of modernity and became oppressive imperial hegemons within their own boundaries.

For Rogaski, the fragmentation of sovereignty over China is seen as a check on the disciplinary power of the GMD state. Some even go so far as to eulogize the fragmented nation as the host of China’s age of openness and cosmopolitanism. For the communists, fragmentation, in terms of not only political sovereignty but also economic unevenness and differences between urban and rural cultural outlooks, was a symptom of China’s peripheral position in the reigning international order. The quest for a cohesive national space and national-popular culture was thus inseparable from the struggle against imperialism and capitalism. Insofar as the spaces of everyday life are politically and economically wedded to those of the nation and the world, it is the attitude to overcoming the unevenness and fragmentation attendant to China’s semicolonial capitalist modernity that distinguished the communist revolutionaries from GMD modernizers despite their common attraction to rationalizing technologies such as the mechanical clock. Reluctant to confront entrenched imperialist interests and rejecting radical social changes, the GMD’s spatial strategy entailed the molding of organic, disciplined fragments that provided an imaginary of a coherent aestheticized national community. The effect of the GMD’s politics of space was not homogenization but the perpetuation of China’s social and political unevenness.
2. Aestheticization of Fragments

In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek established China’s national government in Nanjing after a brutal right-wing coup d’état that ended the GMD’s four-year partnership with the CCP and the Comintern. The coup resulted in the retreat of the party-state from its erstwhile uncompromising stance on warlords and the imperialist powers. Having ceased its military expedition against regional strongmen and participation in Comintern-sponsored anticolonial programs, the GMD contented itself with a national space that was anything but homogenous. Regional warlords pledged perfunctory allegiance to Nanjing while taking every opportunity to consolidate their grip on power. Economic and political interests in the forms of concessions, settlements and extraterritorial rights secured by Western and Japanese imperialisms since the late Qing underpinned the compromised sovereignty enjoyed by the Chinese state and the uneven spread of China’s capitalist economy in terms of geographical and wealth distribution and industrial development. The only centrifugal element the GMD vowed to vanquish was the CCP, which remained a formidable organizational and intellectual force and from 1931 to 1934 even maintained a self-governing socialist republic in the south promising radical socioeconomic changes. In fact, Chiang’s priority to annihilate the communists at all costs meant it neither had the resources nor the political will to directly confront the pockets of empire that remained entrenched in its present space.

In these compromised circumstances, in which the GMD inhabited only a fragment, albeit a sizeable one, of the national space known as China, the purported homogenizing effects of modernity is called into doubt. The party-state was, to be sure, committed to the promotion of globalizing technologies such as the mechanical clock to discipline its subjects, so much so that Chiang made it a priority of the New Life Movement. At the same time, the GMD was wary that modern urban life associated with such Westernized and relatively industrialized capitalist spaces as semicolonial Shanghai would have deleterious influences on the moral fiber and cultural identity of the citizenry. From the list of behaviors Shanghai denizens were exhorted to discard by New Life Movement campaigners, one sees that the urban space was associated with the decadent consumerist culture of for-
eign fashion and fancy snacks, unseemly entertainment such as pornography and dance halls, and such wasteful habits as relishing “meaningless social engagements” (*wuwei yingchou*). As such, the party-state was anxious to deploy the mechanical clock as much to construct a space of disciplined productive efficiency amenable to capitalist accumulation as to project an authentic, aestheticized space of national community and harmony that would not only be different from the existing fragmented and politically compromised space of China but serve as allegories to a salubrious and fully sovereign national space of the future ridded of Western or capitalist decadence. While grudgingly reconciled to Nanjing’s limited sovereignty and committed to capitalist modernity, and thus accentuating its globalizing and homogenizing expansion in China, the GMD sought to contain its centrifugal effects by constructing allegories of national cohesiveness that appealed to an aestheticized Chinese identity derived from the everyday life of its citizenry.

As a state that saw its relationship with citizens as one of a benevolent teacher preparing ignorant children for political life as responsible adults, few of the allegorical spaces the GMD constructed were invested with as much symbolic significance as schools and universities. All schools put emphasis on moral education or *xunyu*, which resonated with *xunzheng*, the political tutelage stage of Sun Yat-sen’s three-stage theory of national reconstruction in which the party-state would train county (*xian*) upon county of citizens to govern or, more appropriately indeed, discipline themselves (*zizhi*) collectively and eventually exercise their promised constitutional rights, at which stage the GMD would relieve itself of its pedagogical duties and hand the state over to the self-governing nation. Not coincidentally, the modern notion of *xun*, rather than referring exclusively to military affairs in Classical Chinese, denotes both training and pedagogy, suggesting the convergence of bodily discipline and ideological transformation. The confluence of GMD revolutionary politics and schooling was not merely epistemological. In a 1928 letter addressed to the GMD party school, the Training Department of the party’s Central Executive Committee argued that it was imperative the new government infuse schooling processes with such aims as cultivating students’ faith in the Three People’s Principles, eradicating feudal thoughts and extravagant practices, and inducting young citizens to
life in the collective by eliminating romantic habits (langman de xiqi)). The Jiangsu provincial education bureau requested, with a view to integrating the curriculum and moral training, that teachers immersed themselves in the life of students, providing close supervision on such matters as room and board, recreation, productive labor (laozuo), and student organizations. An optimal moral training regime, which no campuses except for the most-well-endowed ones could afford, thus required boarding facilities for both teachers and students in which the latter could be constantly socialized and disciplined in an artificially created environment separated from the larger social milieu, one akin to that of elite British public schools. The aim of formalized moral training, expressed in no ambiguous terms, was to induct students into the teachings of the ruling party. As individual spaces inhabited by citizens in the making, schools embodied in multiple senses the future of the fully sovereign nation. The pedagogical turn in the GMD’s revolution took place against the backdrop of Nanjing’s compromised authority over the education sector, with schools and universities, like many other public facilities, based in treaty ports falling outside the jurisdiction of the Nationalist government.

To be sure, Nanjing was disturbed by and did seek to address existing limits to the implementation of its pedagogical enterprise. The Japanese foreign affairs ministry noted with alarm in a 1932 internal report how the Nationalists’ “movement to reclaim the right to educate” (shouhui jiaoyu quan yundong) was disrupting the operation of missionary and foreign-run schools, including those in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, by prohibiting proselytizing and admittance of Chinese nationals. The report observed, however, that such measured intervention was conceived against the backdrop of Nanjing’s inability to take over those institutions outright. Indeed, most foreign- and missionary-run schools and colleges continued to operate throughout the Republican period, many of which, as sites of exclusivity and privilege, were patronized by the small but powerful urban bourgeoisie. These included institutions based in the numerous foreign concessions. A former student at one of the four high schools catering to Chinese residents and run by the Shanghai Municipal Council, the US and British-dominated governing body of the International Settlement,
remembered the textbooks imported from Britain and India, the conspicuous absence of the Chinese national flag, and the prevalence of English in instances of symbolic significance such as the school anthem and motto.\textsuperscript{28} Radical efforts to bring an end to the unevenness and disjunctions in China’s political and social landscape, including the education sector, had to wait until after 1949 with the implementation of Maoist experimentations. For the GMD, symbolic spaces of unity, harmony, and productivity were to compensate for the intractable fragmentation of the nation’s social spaces, a condition that the party-state was unable to confront head-on. School campuses, as state-run facilities, became carefully sculpted enclaves of putative authenticity and wholeness.

The mechanical clock, along with an array of modern devices, was mobilized to sustain organic, integral pedagogical spaces in schools and universities, particularly the more well-resourced state-run ones in urban centers. Punctuality took pride of place in moral training enterprises and was more than just a sinicized Protestant work ethic or an instrumentalist desire for maximizing surplus value. Quantifiable time was, to be sure, the basis for the commodification of labor, and schools were tasked with the preparation of efficient and docile workers, even as Nationalist China was no industrialized economy. Yet, that the GMD presided over an agrarian society made its privileging of the mechanical clock all the more remarkable. While the New Life Movement has been noted for its ostensible devotion to neo-Confucianism, it was also a campaign to “streamline” society and “Taylorize” the masses for eventual engagement in industrial production.\textsuperscript{29} As such, the movement aimed to interpellate a national subject bound equally strongly by modern industry and the accumulation of capital as by “traditions” and an authentic ethnocultural identity. If a fully sovereign nation ridded of class and rural-urban divisions remained a distant dream, the clock could at least be counted upon to offer glimpses of a futural order of virility, civility, and efficiency in which centrifugal tendencies, whether inspired by revolutionary radicalism or a lack of civic-mindedness, were reined in. Thus, besides exhorting urban dwellers to check their timepieces frequently lest they turned up late for appointments or wasted away too many hours on entertainment, a well-calibrated routine of drills, training,
and manual labor was hailed as a means to reform former communists and synchronize their life to the party-state’s fantasy of productivism and ideological purity. A highly regimented routine was a feature of life as much for ideological foes incarcerated in repentance camps as for students studying in schools and universities. For instance, moral education training at Nanjing Girls High School included, among initiatives on hygiene and edifying speeches, compulsory morning drills at 6:30 a.m.; boarders who failed to attend this daily ritual or were late for more than three minutes would receive punishment. The spectacle of healthy young students performing morning exercises together timed by the seamless ticking of the clock was obviously satisfying for educators keen on projecting an image of self-discipline, cooperation, and mutual help. In her 1936 novella *Hands*, Xiao Hong lampooned the spectatorial quality of these drills, particularly the implacable uniformity to which these exercises aspired. Sporting a pair of “bloodless” and “fossil-like” hands, the patrician principal prohibits the “freak,” a poor dyer’s daughter who seems to be permanently out of sync with the rhythm of elite campus life, from attending morning drills for fear that her stained skin would stand out too much from a sea of pale arms and alarm foreign onlookers. That the story is set in Harbin, a city once run by the Russians and now under the occupation of Japanese-controlled Manchukuo, highlights how state educators’ aestheticization of rhythmic uniformity was set against the increasing fragmentation of the national space.

While Chiang Kai-shek had been known for his soft stance on Japanese aggression, imminent challenges to China’s already limited national sovereignty reinforced the GMD’s ambition to cultivate among its young citizens a martial culture of which time discipline was a crucial element. At 4:30 every morning, the older students at Nanjing High School, the Nanjing Girls’ male counterpart, were required to put on their straw sandals and military uniforms for a compulsory two-and-a-half-hour drilling session. In the wake of Japan’s invasion of Shanghai earlier in the year, military training was touted as a means to instill into students not only responsibility and proper moral behaviors but also “the noble spirit of sacrificing oneself for the nation.” Yet Nanjing High paled in comparison with the fastidious time discipline of Suzhou High School. This elite institution, which boasted
among its faculty such accomplished academics as historian Qian Mu and linguist Lü Shuxiang, expected boarders in the junior secondary section to gather for morning drills half an hour upon rising, assemble for another set of drills exactly one minute after the end of the second morning class period, and record their arrival on campus daily, like wage laborers. Those who arrived late for school in the morning or for the drills would be reprimanded, and the number of times each student got reprimanded would be compiled and publicized on a weekly basis. The militarized discipline of campus life was to continue in higher education. Freshmen at the renowned National Wuhan University, for example, were required to be ready for roll call at seven in the morning by military instructors, who were also responsible for checking how well their beds were made and how orderly their clothes were arranged. Clock-time discipline for GMD educators, while undoubtedly a means of grooming docile sellers of labor power, was also a constituent part of a moral training regime that saw as its raison d’être the cultivation among the future citizenry of such lofty ideals as volunteerism, optimism, cooperation, and beauty. More importantly, this ideal citizenry would answer to no power other than the party-state itself.

In GMD revolutionary discourses and political tutelage programs, virtues such as beauty and cooperation had very specific, if not uncontested, meanings that informed the school spaces’ architecture and moral training regimes as allusions to the imagined everyday life of the fully sovereign nation. For party theoretician Chen Lifu (1900–2001), beauty (mei) was the ultimate state of human evolution, a society of abundance and sharing that would overcome all forms of antagonism among humans, including interparty rivalries in liberal capitalist democracies and communist class struggles. The only way this utopian stage of beauty could be reached, Chen declared, was through a process of party-state tutelage in which a revived China, rediscovering its great Confucian tradition of sincerity (cheng), inspired the populace to enhance productive efficiency under the social elite in a state of “mutual help, trust, and love.” In economic terms, this grandiose musing of human evolution and the beautification (meihua) of life was to take the decidedly more conventional form of state capitalism (guojia ziben zhuyi). For party ideologue Dai Jitao (1890–1949), a former socialist who maintained great interest in the agricultural cooperative
movement, the crux of the Nationalist-led revolution as pioneered by Sun Yat-sen, who injected fresh energy into the traditional Confucian spiritual qualities of wisdom, benevolence, and courage, was to save China from imperialist political and economic control and build a “communist” society by developing an industrial capitalistic economy and making it owned, run, and enjoyed by the people. China’s revolutionary plenitude would then form the basis for universal harmony (shijie datong). The GMD revolution, which promised to channel the labor of all classes to delivering the nation out of imperialist domination, was touted as being far superior to the violent and antagonistic nature of communist class struggle and working-class internationalist solidarity.

Insofar as beauty and cooperation were key concepts in the GMD’s striving for an authentic, harmonious order under a fully sovereign China, the mechanical clock by itself was inadequate for realizing these ideals in school spaces. The physical location of the campuses and their architecture were also critical in ensuring the efficacy of these aestheticized spaces. School campuses were to be located away from the hustle and bustle of everyday social life associated with modern cities. They were to avoid factories, railways, and “organizations at odds with hygiene and morality” such as taverns and teahouses. Particularly for schools in major metropolitan centers, the anomic and decadent distractions of modern cosmopolitan life were considered inimical to the cultivation of a healthy, stoic citizenry. Nanjing Girls reported that its original campuses, one of which was built in 1914, were too close to urban “hubbub and chaos and not very conducive to studying.” To move to a more idyllic environment, the school was to build a new campus on a plot of government land near Qingliang Mountain, a site of great significance in the imperial history of the capital. Another feature that would distinguish school campuses from modern Westernized urban spaces was the architecture of campus buildings. Ideal school buildings were built in a style reminiscent of Chinese imperial architecture, which combined modern construction methods and materials with Chinese architectural motifs. Topped with tiled roofs and often furnished with lacquer, this Sino-Western fusion, despite its having been spearheaded by US missionary colleges operating in treaty ports, was deployed by the GMD in its civic and government buildings to assert its claim of being both a modernizer and a faithful cus-
An architecture that alluded to China’s imperial past underpinned a campus such as Suzhou High’s, with its manicured trees, serpentine bridges, and stone pavilions, to create a symbolic space of authentic plenitude distinct from the coastal cities’ everyday spaces of compromised sovereignty and commercial decadence. Even substantially less resourceful institutions, such as the elementary schools donated by the Singaporean Chinese entrepreneur Aw Boon Haw in the latter half of the 1930s, aspired to adopt the “Chinese style” (Zhongguo shì), albeit with the caveat that campuses be simple and solidly built.

School spaces were distinguished from the fragmented, colonized national space by not only its aesthetics but also the intersubjective relations among its student body and the mechanisms that defined them. Cooperation (hezuo) among members of school communities took institutional forms that corresponded to the GMD vision of an ideal corporativist polity. The student-run cooperative (hezuo she) was a common feature of school spaces from elementary school through university. The student cooperative, along with placement in production and military facilities operated by other state agencies, was part of Nanjing High’s moral education program, which explicitly took as its objective “instructing students to live as a collective (tuanti) based on the spirit of political tutelage in order to enhance [their ability of] self-governance.” Suzhou High’s sprawling campus allowed the junior secondary section to operate not only a cooperative but also a savings bank, endowing it with an even better semblance of a self-functioning body politic. At Wuhan University, all students and teachers, along with the university administration, were required to subscribe to a certain number of shares in the cooperative, depending on their position in the institution’s hierarchy. The cooperative at the elementary school attached to Taicang Teachers College, again as part of the moral education program, was placed under the control of the student “Datong [literally universal harmony] City” government. The corporativist ownership society these school spaces alluded to was presented as a superior alternative to the capitalist, foreign-dominated economy that so compromised China as a sovereign subject.

The corporate nature of the school spaces was not confined to economics. Educators put great stress on instructing students to govern themselves, not unlike how the GMD promised to train the citizenry to exercise their
rights (*minquan*) as a “responsible,” disciplined collective. The everyday was identified as the site for thorough reform. But rather than mobilizing the masses to bring about changes in relations of production, Chiang Kai-shek exhorted young citizens to change the ways they conducted their “real life” (*shiji shenghuo*), understood nominally to include hygienic practices and daily conduct abstracted from larger social processes. Citing Japan as a model of strength, the Nationalist leader observed that education in China had failed the nation and the GMD revolutionary enterprise by not correcting young people’s unruly behaviors. “In which school,” Chiang demanded, “can one find students who go out in neat clothing, properly cropped hair; who stride in unison, with eyes looking straight, and who don’t bend their backs, bow their heads or spit?” China’s weakness lay not in its military force but in its poorly trained people. The key to national revival was thus education, more specifically, the molding of a new generation of disciplined, voluntaristic revolutionary subjects.

Insofar as campuses were allegorical of the nation’s bright future, student life was to be organized by the best semblance of an idealized corporativist political machinery. Shanghai High School imposed pledges (*gongyue*) on students in a range of issues from the right to assembly and distributing posters to taking leave and using the washrooms. The use of the term *pledge* instead of *guideline* or simply *rule* is remarkable, as it evoked the Lockean ideal polity in which individual subjects engage in contractual relationships with each other. Datong City, the student government at the Taicang Teachers College elementary, was subdivided, employing suggestive spatial metaphors, into four departments (*bu*), which were in turn subdivided into one to three districts (*qu*). Each student was to belong to one of the districts and, from second grade onward, elect a district commissioner as a member of his or her district assembly. In addition to being represented by district commissioners, “citizens” (*shimin*) also elected department prefects and a “mayor,” who would then appoint “officials” to the various bureaus of the “municipal” government. The four bureaus that composed the executive branch of the government — recreation, social affairs, science, and enterprise — ran such organizations as a news agency, a small clinic, a library, a small workshop, and even a post office. The complex structure of the Datong “government” and the plethora of functions it was supposed
to perform amounted almost to a parody of the GMD's zealous drive to create alternative spaces where efficient, omnipotent governments ruled over happy, cooperative citizens. A similar, though less elaborate, setup was in place at Shanghai High, where the junior secondary and senior secondary sections each had a student self-governing body. The executive committee of the student self-governing association at Wuhan University was to take the form of a presidium (weiyuan zhi), apparently to avoid the predominance of individuals and emulate the GMD's Leninist structure. The daily functioning of these student governments were, unsurprisingly, placed under the watchful eyes of school authorities and GMD cadres stationed in the campuses. Wuhan University's student government, for instance, was subjected to the supervision of the local GMD branch and prohibited from participating in the administration of the university itself. The organic, hierarchal political and economic order that structured the everyday life of school campuses was the stark opposite of the circumscribed, corrupt, and oftentimes poorly coordinated political authority of the GMD, the self-appointed custodian of China's national government.

Inasmuch as the spaces of Nationalist China's educational institutions encompassed the entire network of social relationships within and beyond their boundaries, the role of clock-time in these spaces was overdetermined by the ideological specificities of the GMD vis-à-vis the historical conjuncture in which it was embedded. In itself, the mechanical clock might indeed have often been a disciplinary tool to rein in the idiosyncrasies of laboring bodies that increasingly came under the sovereignty of the modern state form. Yet the various nation-states, while sharing a number of assumptions on how they ought to interact with individual subjects, were by no means equally invested in the global capitalist order that invariably defined the social spaces of which they were a part.

As a reactionary regime committed to a (pseudo-)revolution of beauty and national revival, the GMD was deeply uncomfortable with the persistence of imperialist interests that, since the late Qing, dominated the political, economic, and cultural life of coastal China, not to mention the minds of many nationalists whose aspirations the party claimed to represent. Yet, given the party's intricate ties to bourgeois interests embedded in the treaty-port economy, its aversion to radical social changes, and its stubborn deter-
mination to destroy the communists, the GMD was unwilling to confront the Euroamerican empires that were reluctant to forsake their interests in China or the Japanese one that was actively plotting to enhance its already formidable clout in the country. For the entirety of the Nanjing Decade (1927–37), when the GMD enjoyed its tightest grip on power since its inception, the party-state’s frustrated quest to acquire full sovereignty was thus concerned with neither confronting imperialism nor realigning social relations but the creation of alternative spaces that alluded to the utopia of an indeterminate future.

The organic school spaces that hosted the GMD’s utopia were to be distinct from the tension-ridden, consumerist, Westernized, and anomic everyday spaces in urban China that the party-state was not prepared to fully address. It has recently been suggested that the diverse tools the GMD deployed in its education processes implies the party-state’s ideological eclecticism and room for students to enact multiple, including liberal individualist, modes of citizenship. Pledges and student governments might indeed have been pedagogical techniques regularly deployed in Western liberal democracies. What such analysis leaves out, setting aside the complex issue of whether all liberal tenets were necessarily anathema to the politics of such interwar reactionary regimes as the GMD, is the way a tool could have been hailed to perform multiple, seemingly contradictory, social roles. The clock, being so embedded in the capitalist urban everyday and having contributed to the emergence of atomized individuals operating as mechanical units to the ticking of the machine, was in itself not at all well placed to help the GMD achieve its goal. As part of a larger moral training program, however, a time discipline evocative of Charlie Chaplin’s *Modern Times*, along with institutions such as student governments and cooperatives, became important mechanisms by which a space of volunteerism and mutual love could be projected. Not unlike how fascist Italy and Nazi Germany deployed cinema, exhibitions, and mass rituals to lift the people out of the individualized experience of time under liberal capitalism and connect them to the epic communal “new time” of the nation, the idyllic location of GMD’s ideal school campuses and the “traditional” architectural idiom in which their buildings were designed endowed these spaces with a monumentality that
was alien to the experience of dislocation, unevenness, and haphazardness in the commercialized spaces of the treaty ports.60

3. Toward a Total Critique of Capitalist Space

Scholars informed by poststructuralism are often quick to celebrate what they see as the subversive potential of anarchic and contingent spaces vis-à-vis the totalizing drive of modernity. Hwang Jinlin, showing how the body can serve as a channel for political practice, described with approval how the moral indignation and high passion of students participating in protests, petitions, and parades transformed early twentieth-century Beijing urban spaces into potent sites of resistance against a corrupt government.61 Writing on a rather different form of space, architectural historian Anthony Vidler endorses how postmodern architecture challenges the instrumental universal order of Taylorist time-and-motion studies and creates spaces that articulate the politics of gender, sexuality, and ethnicity.62 The unraveling of dehumanizing and corrupt order is no doubt worthy of celebration. But the politics of space, insofar as it is defined as the disruption of the prevailing “rationalist” order by the assertion of genuine emotions and authentic identities, did not always lead to emancipatory results. In Nationalist China, a fetish of technological regimen enjoined an equally strong drive for spaces that housed a distinctive ethnic community, even as the state was much less resolute in putting an end to social inequalities and the nation’s economic and political heterogeneities. As David Harvey reminds us, capitalism is simultaneously a ruthlessly universalizing phenomenon and one that blithely celebrates local distinctiveness. This tension inherent to capitalism inflected the many modernist artistic and political movements since the late nineteenth century, when the valorization of efficiency, rationality, and universalism coexisted tenaciously with the earnest drive for local specificities and aesthetic qualities.63 What appears to be the Nationalist movement’s schizophrenic espousal of both the homogenizing industrial culture and aestheticized national identity becomes perfectly comprehensible under the logic of capitalist globalization.

The experience of the GMD, like those of other interwar reactionary
political movements, suggests that the quest for alternatives to capitalist modernity has to be a total project. As this essay has shown, the GMD’s search for spaces not infested with the anomie and unevenness of capitalism was premised on its implication in the unequal social relations that plagued Chinese society. The campus spaces that were supposed to offer models of everyday life that could overcome reification under treaty-port consumerism were cooperative, closely knit, and even self-contained communities, but they themselves were powered by the same Taylorist techniques, such as stringent time discipline, which contributed to workers’ alienation in industrial societies. In both conception and execution, GMD spatial politics fell far short of confronting the causes of alienation historically specific to capitalism, that is, private property and the subordination of use-value to exchange value. Henri Lefebvre astutely observed that the emancipation of full human potential from the alienating effects of labor time cannot be overcome through the mere creation of new spaces. Insofar as spaces are the underpinnings on which the existence of social relations depends — and that in capitalism, the same set of social relations exists on nothing smaller than a global scale — the strategy of resisting oppression by fashioning new spaces of entropic differences is fundamentally flawed. Not unlike the ceaseless extraction of surplus value from labor power, modern imperialism was part and parcel of global capitalism. Challenges to imperialist domination, as well as resistance to the logic of capitalist production, cannot be effective if the furthest one goes is to agitate for new spaces and pretend they exist independently from the unequal power relations that engulf them. This celebration of pluralistic differences, Slavoj Žižek warns, not only works to entrench capitalist globalization but can easily feed into populist fundamentalism. The divide between postmodernist pluralism and fundamentalism hinges merely on “the different perspective from which observer views a movement for maintaining a group identity.”

As the Nationalist regime was itself embedded in China’s political fragmentation and economic unevenness, the task of bringing an end to the nation’s modern quagmire rested with the social revolution the CCP promised. While the GMD shared with its communist foes a Leninist organizational form and a commitment to nation-building, it was the latter who had the will and strategies to delink China from treaty-port capital-
ism, lay the basics of an industrial and generally egalitarian economy, and safeguard the nation’s economic and political independence from new Cold War forms of imperialist domination.67 The form of anti-imperialism that energized the GMD movement, in aestheticizing national identity and abstracting it from the social, did not even begin to tackle the basis of China’s disadvantaged position in the global capitalist order, and the party-state’s nation-building project ended up being a sordid disappointment. The Maoist experiment might have entailed an even more carefully calibrated time regime for urban workers, but it is ultimately how the mechanical clock and other technologies were deployed to confront the totality of social relations that gave shape to both global and local spaces which distinguished anticolonial and socialist movements from ardent modernizers on the other end of the political spectrum.

Notes

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2. Soong May-ling, General Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Crisis (Shanghai: China Weekly Review Press, 1935), 55–73, collected in Pei-kai Cheng, Michael Lestz, and Jonathan Spence eds., The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection (New York: Norton, 1999), 294–98. The editors, in their introduction to documents on the movement, note sarcastically in reference to the ideological implications of the movement how “clichéd Neo-Confucian virtues . . . were to be the formulae for national revival” (294).


5. Lefebvre, Production of Space, 404. Technologies in this essay encompass, but are not confined to, the more commonsensical definition of them being concerned primarily with production. Michel Foucault lists four types of technologies — production, sign systems, power,
and the self—and observes that they operate in tandem rather than in isolation. This essay adopts Foucault’s expansive definition of technology, such that the mechanical clock is a tool to further both industrial productivity and social organization. Notably, Foucault states that he is primarily interested in technologies of domination and the self, and not those of production that Karl Marx’s Capital examined. Whether this leads to Foucault’s unwillingness to take seriously the rise of the industrial working class in capitalist societies has to be the topic of another essay. See Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (New York: The New Press, 1997), 224–25.

6. Remarkably, Foucault himself does not necessarily see governmentality, or rationalized state management of human populations, as equivalent to statism or a fetish of the bureaucracy. In a course synopsis on biopolitics, he succinctly observes that while liberalism departed from the “reason of state” by questioning the expansion of state power, it also implies a method of rationalizing governmental practices. Ideologues of small government such as US neoliberals are no dissidents of modern governmentality (Foucault, “The Birth of Biopolitics,” in Ethics, 73–79). Unfortunately, this nuance is usually lost in narratives that rest modern power relations with command economy, bureaucratic control, or simply authoritarianism.


11. Ibid., 175.


13. Ibid., 299.


15. Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments, 234–35.


19. A similar list for the inland city of Nanchang, the communist stronghold recently reclaimed by the GMD, shared with Shanghai’s items related to hygiene and social manners but not those on imported clothes and lavish festivities. See Shanghai’s “Xin shenghuo gongyue cao’an” (“Draft of the New Life Movement Pledge”) and Nanchang’s “Xin shenghuo yundong biaoyu” (“New Life Movement Slogans”), in *Chongbian riyong baike quanshu* (see n. 1), 1945–46 and 1950–51.


22. “Guomindang zhongyang mishuchu lüsong xunlian bu yiding de jiaoyu mubiao an zhi Ding Weifen han” (“Suggestion on Education Objectives Drafted by the Training Department as Filed and Sent to Ding Weifen by the GMD Central Secretariat”), in *Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian* (*Collected Archival Sources on Republican Chinese History*), vol. 1, ser. 5:1, ed. Zhongguo di’er dang’an guan (Second Historical Archives of China) (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1991), 1–3.


26. Gaimushô bunka jigyô bu (Cultural Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
27. Ibid.
31. Jiangsu sheng jiaoyu ting, Jiangsu jiaoyu gailan, 222.
33. Ibid., 206.
34. Ibid., 236.
37. Ibid., 72, 202.
38. Ibid., 71–73.
41. Huang et al., Chongbian riyong baike quanshu, 1953.
42. Jiangsu sheng jiaoyu ting, Jiangsu jiaoyu gailan, 217.
43. Huang et al., Chongbian riyong baike quanshu, 1968–69.
45. Jiangsu sheng jiaoyu ting, Jiangsu jiaoyu gailan, 240.
46. Executive Yuan secretariat, letter to the aide’s office of the National Military Council, June 18, 1937, Nationalist Government collection, Academia Historica, Taipei County, Taiwan.
47. Ibid., 202–3.
48. Ibid., 240.
50. Jiangsu sheng jiaoyu ting, Jiangsu jiaoyu gailan, 534.
52. “Jiang Jieshi zai Changsha gejie daibiao hui shang zuo guanyu jiaoyu zhongyao xing de
jiangyan” (“Chiang Kai-shek Delivered a Speech on the Importance of Education in a Meeting of Representatives from Various Sectors in Changsha”), in Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao, ser. 5:1, 141–45.
53. Jiangsu sheng jiaoyu ting, Jiangsu jiaoyu gailan, 250.
54. Ibid., 532–35.
55. Ibid., 248.
56. Wuhan daxue yilan, 277–78.
57. Ibid.
64. Lefebvre, Production of Space, 408.
65. Ibid., 401–4.
67. For a sympathetic, though far from celebratory, appraisal of Maoist China’s economic performance, see Carl Riskin, China’s Political Economy: The Quest for Development since 1949 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).